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Over the past few years the European Union has 
engaged actively in legal relations with third 
States and other international organisations. By 
now the Union has become a party to some 
eighty international agreements. With the 
increasing legal activity of the European Union 
on the international plane, particularly reflected 
in the coming of age of the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP),2 the question of its 
legal accountability becomes more prominent. 
Whereas the international legal responsibility of 
the European Community has been subject to 
extensive legal analysis,3 the same does not 
hold true for the European Union.4 It is unclear 
whether the Union as such may be held 
accountable for any wrongful act. While there 
are good reasons to assume that the Union 
already enjoyed an international legal status 
from the outset,5 this does not imply that its 
external relations regime is therefore also 
comparable to the rules we know from 
Community law. The general perception is that 
the relationship between the European Union 
and its member states in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) – and to a lesser 
extent in the Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters (PJCC) is still clearly different 
from the relation the same member states 
maintain with the European Community, and 
that therefore different rules apply in relation to 
the legal effects of agreements concluded by 
the Union. 
 
Both the conclusion of international agreements 
by the Union and its international activities in 
relation to military missions call for a fresh look 
at the relation between the Union and its 
member states in terms of international 
responsibility. If Henry Kissinger were in office, 
he would have every reason to raise the 
question ‘Whom should I sue?’, now that his 
famous question on the telephone number of 
Europe has been answered by the availability of 
the number of the High Representative for 
CFSP, Javier Solana.  
 
Shared Competences in European Foreign 
Policy 
 
With regard to international agreements 
concluded by the Union, Article 24 TEU is the 
applicable provision. The scope of this provision 
extends to police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, as the cross-references in 
Articles 24 (CFSP) and 38 (PJCC) indicate. This 
turns the provision into the general legal basis for 
the Union’s treaty-making, which may even be 
used to conclude cross-pillar (second and third) 
agreements.6 The debate on whether such 
agreements are concluded by the Council on 
behalf of the Union or on behalf of the member 
states seems to be superseded by practice now 
that the Union has become a party to a number 
of international agreements on the basis of 
Article 24.7 And even before that it was clear that 
‘it would hardly be persuasive to contend that 
such treaties are in reality treaties concluded by 
individual Member States.’8 Most agreements are 
concluded within the framework of the ESDP, and 
relate to the participation of a third country in an 
EU mission or to the status of an EU mission in a 
third country. But agreements have also been 
concluded in the PJCC area and between the EU 
and other international organizations. Examples 
include the 2005 Agreement between the EU and 
Canada establishing a framework for the 
participation of Canada in the EU crisis 
management operations, the Agreement between 
the EU and the Democratic Republic of Congo on 
the status and activities of EUPOL Kinshasa, the 
2006 Agreement between the EU and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer 
of passenger name record (PNR) data by air 
carriers to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, or the 2006 Agreement 
between the International Criminal Court and the 
EU on cooperation and assistance.9
 
While ‘mixity’ has become the solution in the 
Community to overcome the division of 
competences, the international agreements 
concluded under CFSP are – perhaps ironically – 
exclusively concluded by the European Union.10 It 
would of course go too far to conclude on an 
exclusive competence for the Union on this basis. 
In fact the whole system of CFSP as described 
above seems to point to the existence of ‘shared’, 
or better, ‘parallel’ competences: both the Union 
and its member states seem to be competent to 
conclude treaties in the area of CFSP (including 
ESDP). This implies that, once the Union has 
concluded an international agreement, there is 
no direct legal relationship between the member 
states and the contracting third party.  
 
Conclusion of Agreements by the Council 
 
The international agreements to which the Union 
has become a party may largely be categorised 
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as follows: 
 
1. Agreements between the EU and a third 
state on the participation of that state in 
an EU operation; 
2. Agreements between the EU and a third 
state on the status or activities of EU 
forces; 
3. Agreements between the EU and a third 
state in the area of PJCC; 
4. Agreements between the EU and a third 
state on the exchange of classified 
information; 
5. Agreements between the EU and other 
international organisations; 
6. Agreements between the EU and a third 
state in the form of an exchange of 
letters; 
7. Joint Declarations and Memoranda of 
Understanding between the European 
Union and a third state; 
8. Agreements concluded by European Union 
agencies. 
 
The Treaty regime in Article 24 TEU is reflected in 
the way this provision has been used by the 
Union in practice. Recent research by Thym 
reveals that the procedure through which 
agreements are concluded confirms the central 
position of the Union’s institutions and organs at 
all stages of the decision-making process.11
 
It is indeed striking that all agreements are 
concluded by the ‘European Union’ only; the 
member states are not mentioned as parties. This 
clearly deviates from earlier arrangements in 
which the Union was merely used to coordinate 
the external policies of the member states.12 The 
entire decision-making process as well as the 
conclusion of the agreement does not reveal a 
separate role for the member states. Apart from 
the references to the European Union in both the 
texts and the preamble of the agreements and 
the fact that adoption and ratification is done ‘on 
behalf of the Union’, this is confirmed by the 
central role of the Union’s institutions and organs 
(including the Presidency, the Council’s working 
parties and the Council Secretariat), and the final 
publication in the L-series of the Official Journal 
(decision on inter se agreements of the member 
states are published in the C-series).13 Indeed, 
‘fairly strange operations would be needed to 
demonstrate that a treaty concluded under such 
circumstances has instead created legal bonds 
between the third party concerned and each one 
of the Member States of the European Union.’14
 
It goes beyond the scope of this contribution to 
investigate the parliamentary procedures related 
to these agreements in all 27 member states, 
but based on some discussions it seems that 
member states generally do not consider the EU 
agreements relevant to be put through their 
regular parliamentary procedure.15 As ratification 
by the governments of the member states is not 
required for agreements concluded by the Union, 
their constitutional requirements simply do not 
apply. 
 
Conclusion: Mixed Responsibilities for the 
Union and its Member States? 
 
Returning to the renewed ‘Kissinger question’: it 
seems that responsibility should first of all be 
sought at the level of the EU as this is the only 
contracting party. International treaty law seems 
to point to the presumption that member states 
are not liable for any conduct of the 
organisation. This presumption may, however, 
be rebutted and in the case of the EU no 
provisions or procedures on the non-contractual 
liability exist and a collective responsibility may 
be the result. An example could be the inability 
of the Union to live up to either its obligations 
arising out of the agreement or to more general 
(customary) obligations for instance related to 
the protection of human rights. Some recent 
case law could be interpreted as supporting this 
view.16
 
In practice, situations in which the question of 
international responsibility needed to be 
answered have not yet come up. Generally, 
claims – for instance related to the liability of a 
military mission – are dealt with within a private 
law system and born by the responsible national 
contingent in a mission. This may very well flow 
from the fact that even member states 
themselves have not concluded on their own 
immunity and accept responsibility for their 
behaviour in EU operations. While concrete 
issues are thus settled on a case by case basis, 
Naert recently presented some more general 
rules of guidance in these matters.17 In his view 
member states remain responsible for any 
violation of their own international obligations, 
including through or by the EU, whenever the 
opposite would lead to an evasion of their 
international obligations. 
 
This ‘piercing of the institutional veil’ may 
certainly be required from a practical point of 
view. After all, it remains difficult to sue 
international organisations even if they have 
violated agreements to which they are a party. 
On a more principled note, however, the 
question remains whether holding the member 
states responsible is legitimate, taking into 
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account the fact that in almost all cases the EU 
agreements have not even been dealt with at 
the domestic level: national parliamentary 
involvement has been excluded and 
governmental involvement has been limited to a 
vote as a member of one of the organisations 
institutions. The conclusion could therefore be 
that in cases where the Union is simply not able 
and/or willing to answer any legitimate demands 
of a third party, the proper route for the Union 
would nevertheless be to accept responsibility at 
the international level and to seek for 
compensation on the basis of internal EU law in 
relation to its own member states. After all, to 
conclude with a politico-legal statement: ‘An 
entity discarding any notion of liability for its 
conduct could not be taken seriously in 
international dealings. As strange as it may 
seem, the capacity to incur international 
responsibility is an essential element of the 
recognition of international organisations in 
general and of the European Union in particular 
as entities enjoying personality under 
international law.’18◊ 
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